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Abstract― Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) technology is being 
increasingly adopted in a wide variety of applications ranging 
from home/building and industrial automation to more safety 
critical applications including e-health or infrastructure 
monitoring. Considering mobility in the above application 
scenarios actually introduces additional technological challenges, 
especially with respect to security. The resource constrained 
devices should be robust to diverse security attacks and 
communicate securely while they are moving in the considered 
environment. To this aim, proper authentication and key 
management schemes supporting node mobility should be used. 
This paper presents an effective mutual authentication and key 
establishment scheme for heterogeneous sensor networks 
consisting of numerous mobile sensor nodes and only a few more 
powerful fixed sensor nodes. Moreover, OMNET++ simulations 
are used to provide a comprehensive performance evaluation of 
the proposed scheme. The obtained results show that the 
proposed solution assures better network connectivity, consumes 
less memory, has low communication overhead during the 
authentication and key establishment phase and has better 
network resilience against mobile nodes attacks compared with 
existing approaches for authentication and key establishment. 
Keywords―Heterogeneous Sensor Networks; Mobile Nodes; Fixed Nodes; 
Security; 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) consist of a number of 
constrained devices with limited resources in terms of 
computational power, communication capability and 
memory/storage resources. Such nodes are usually 
characterized by low cost, low power and multifunctional 
capabilities making them suitable for ubiquitous and pervasive 
applications such as home/building, industry automation, 
environmental monitoring, health-care and even military 
surveillance. WSNs can be deployed in both controlled (e.g., 
buildings) and uncontrolled locations (e.g., public spaces). 
The inherent WSN characteristics including resources 
scarcity, limited communication bandwidth and ad-hoc 
networking capability introduce many challenges also with 
respect to secure communication. To assure a certain level of 
security, specific countermeasures need to be selected in order 
to protect the nodes from diverse possible attacks. However, 
the limited resources hinder the adoption of classical security 
approaches. As a consequence, new security solutions suitable 
for WSNs are being defined. More specifically, key 
management can be considered as the basic foundation upon 
which other security primitives are built. Researchers have 
proposed a number of key management schemes in the 
literature. Asymmetric cryptography (RSA) and the Elliptic 
Curve Cryptography (ECC) were initially considered not to be 
suitable for most sensor applications due to their high 
computational cost, energy consumption and storage 
requirements. Nevertheless, recent studies showed that public 
key cryptography such as Elliptic Curve (due to small key size 
and low computational overhead) and Rabin’s scheme (due to 
fast encryption/decryption time compared to RSA) might be 
feasible even in sensor networks [7][8].  
WSNs can be basically divided into two main categories 
(1) homogeneous sensor networks and (2) heterogeneous 
sensor networks. Homogeneous sensor networks attracted 
most of the researcher’s attentions in developing the security 
algorithms. However, their fundamental scalability and 
performance limitations [9, 3], proved by both theoretical [2] 
and simulation analysis [3], forced researchers to think about 
Heterogeneous Sensor Networks (HSNs) incorporating a 
mixture of nodes with widely varying capabilities [4]. Yarvis 
[11] increases average delivery rate and network life time 
without increasing the cost by introducing energy and link 
heterogeneity along with the proper deployment of HSNs. 
Duarte-Melo and Liu analyzed energy consumption and life 
time of HSNs in [6] by providing periodic data from the 
sensing field to remote receiver. 
This paper proposes an online key generation and 
management scheme for HSNs, extending the work presented 
in [32]. The main contribution of this paper is to reduce the 
communication overhead and energy consumption by 
optimizing the initial node authentication step, which is 
fundamental to keep the energy cost of the overall approach 
low. This paper also introduces a novel mutual authentication 
and key establishment procedure maintaining better network 
connectivity and resilience against node capture attacks 
compared to competing approaches. The paper is organized as 
follows: Section 2 introduces the related work; Section 3 
describes the proposed scheme, while OMNET++ simulation 
results are discussed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes 
the paper. 
II. RELATED WORK 
This section provides an overview of state of the art key 
management schemes that have been presented in literature for 
both homogeneous and heterogeneous WSNs. 
Perrig et al. [16] presented SPINS, a centralized keying 
method for sensor networks in which each node contains a 
secret key whose corresponding key is stored in the base 
station and uses one-way hash chains for creating an epoch-
delayed key release mechanism for the use in authenticated 
broadcast. However, two sensor nodes cannot have a common 
secret key directly. If two nodes A and B want to establish a 
communication key with each other, A sends a request to B, 
which creates and forwards a token to the base station. The 
base station then generates a session key for A and B, encrypts 
it with the secret keys that it shares with A and B and then 
sends encrypted data to A and B respectively. Since the nodes 
use the base station as a trusted server to establish a secret key, 
this scheme will not work if the base station is not reachable 
or has a high communication overhead, especially in the case 
of multi-hop communication. 
Eschenauer and Gligor [12] proposed a random key pre-
distribution scheme that does not require the base station for 
the key establishment between any two nodes. According to 
this scheme, a set of randomly selected keys from a large pool 
is assigned to each sensor node before the network 
deployment. Two nodes communicate directly to establish a 
secret communication key only if they have at least one key in 
common. Chan [13] further improved the security of [12] by 
introducing the “q keys” concept. To establish a secret key, 
two nodes must share at least q keys but this scheme requires 
storing a large number of keys in each sensor node. Liu [7] 
presented a key establishment scheme using a prior knowledge 
of node deployment coupled with Rabin’s scheme [1] to 
achieve a high degree of connectivity (while reducing the 
memory cost) and network resilience against the node capture 
attacks. Zhang [22] presented the NPKPS pairwise key pre-
distribution scheme for WSNs to achieve better security, 
connectivity and efficiency and less memory cost compared to 
[12]. Efficient authentication schemes are proposed in [30] 
and [31] which improve over past work in terms of security, 
authentication overhead and storage requirements. 
In order to present a key management scheme that 
reduces energy cost and supports node mobility, Kim [23] 
proposed a level-based key management scheme for multicast 
communication that has reasonable routing overhead and low 
mobility management overhead. For mobility supported 
cluster-based WSNs, a two-layered dynamic key management 
scheme was proposed by Chuang [24] while polynomial-based 
key pre-distribution scheme for mobile sensor networks was 
proposed by Blundo [14]. Sarmad [32] presented a runtime 
key generation scheme for the authentication and secret key 
establishment to reduce the memory cost and increase the 
network resilience. Camtepe and Yener [15] proposed a 
combinatorial design approach for key pre-distribution. First 
they proposed a simple key pre-distribution scheme based on 
Finite Projective Plane (FPP) which provides direct key 
establishment, tolerance to node capture and no computational 
and communication overhead, but with limited network 
scalability and resilience and without node authentication. 
Their hybrid approach augments scalability of the initial 
scheme to the cost of sacrificing direct connectivity. 
Sanchez and Baldus [18] apply an FPP design to the pre-
distribution of Blundo polynomial shares. Their approach 
enables direct pairwise key establishment for a large number 
of nodes independent of the physical connectivity of the WSN. 
To reduce the memory overhead and support node mobility 
among different networks, Maerien [27] proposed the 
MAnagement of Secret keYs protocol (MASY) for mobile 
WSNs which assigns to a node only one symmetric key, 
shared only with the back-end server of its network, and which 
assumes a trust relationship between the newly entered 
network and the node’s old parent network.  
For HSNs, Du [17] presented an unbalanced key pre-
distribution scheme to improve network connectivity, reduce 
memory overhead and provide better network resilience 
compared with existing key management schemes for 
homogeneous sensor networks. Nodes with high capabilities 
are assigned m keys, while nodes with low capabilities are 
assigned l keys, m>>l. Sarmad [26] presented a two key pool 
approach for secret key generation in mobile HSNs which 
reduces the memory overhead and increases network 
resilience compared to [17]. Zhang [29] presented a group 
oriented key management scheme for HSNs in which a large 
key pool is split into a sub key pool for each group, while a 
routing-driven key management scheme based ECC is 
presented by Du [8]. Their results show better connectivity 
and network resilience than [12], [17]. Symmetric key 
distribution based on public key cryptography using prior 
knowledge of sensor deployment location provides better 
resilience against node capture, as well as lower memory cost 
and computational overhead [20]. Sajid [19] presented an 
online generation of secret key by storing a small number of 
generation key in each sensor node before the deployment of 
HSNs. Two low capability nodes request a high capability 
node to discover a shared generation key between them and 
use a random number to generate a secret communication key.  
In order to support node addition and node revocation, 
Poornima [21] proposed a tree based key management scheme 
for HSNs while Xinyu Jin [28] presented an Unpredictable 
Software-based Attestation Solution (USAS) for compromised 
node detection in mobile sensor networks.  
III. PROPOSED SCHEME 
In this section, the proposed key establishment scheme for 
HSNs is presented. The reference network model defines a 
HSN composed of a Base Station (BS), Fixed Nodes (FNs) 
and Mobile Nodes (MNs). These nodes are heterogeneous in 
terms of computational power, memory and energy resources. 
However, the same communication technology is adopted. 
The BS and the FNs are powerful devices while MNs are 
characterized by very limited resources and can change their 
position within the given environment following a specific 
mobility model. Moreover, the MNs are more numerous than 
the FNs, and only the FNs need to be equipped with tamper-
resistant hardware.  
In this resulting scenario, the BS only communicates with 
the FNs and acts as a trusted server for them. To address 
scalability issues, a cluster-based approach has been adopted 
(similarly as in [32]). In fact, FNs act as Cluster Heads (CHs) 
and are in charge of managing authentication and key 
establishment operations for a group of MNs. 
Network Public 
Key 
A
U
T
H
E
N
T
I
C
A
T
I
O
N 
K
E
Y
 
E
S
T
A
B
L
I
S
H
M
E
N
T 
MN 
Authentication 
Key 
Hello Message 
Secret Key Data 
Acknowledgement 
Hello
No
MN’s ID 
Secret Key + IDMN 
Secret Key + IDMN 
D
AcknoSecret Key
Network Private 
Key 
Hello Response 
MN Hello 
Message Network 
Public/Private 
Key 
MN 
Authentication 
Key 
A. Proposed Scheme Overview 
Node authentication and key establishm
security features provided by the proposed 
authentication phase is performed among 
MNs. Once the authentication phase 
completed, key establishment operations c
among the MNs and FNs. The proposed 
mobility by providing the two considered f
scenario where MNs move from one cluste
Fig. 1 depicts the main operations of the pro
the HSNs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Overview of proposed al
B. Key Pre-Distribution 
In this section, key pre-distribution am
the MNs is described. A secret key (SK) is 
MN; more specifically, such key is generat
Key Generator (SKG), a prime number that 
each MN of the network (MNPN), and t
generated prime numbers (using MNPN and
the prime number generator) using a one
generation function f( ). The key establishm
discussed in section III.E.  
Base Station Fixed Nodes Mobile Node 
Updating Record List 
Neighboring FNs 
Secret Key Generation using 
f(PN1, PN2, SKG, MNPN) 
Updating Neighborin
MNs List 
Generating Secret Key For MNs 
using their MNPNs, SKG and 
neighboring MN prime numbers
If FNs Hello 
Messages not 
Received 
Authentication Key Generation 
(MNAKG) and Verifying Nonce
FNPNS, Random 
Number,  
Kauth{Nonce, MNPN} 
FNPNS, Random 
Number,  
Kauth{Nonce, MNPN} 
Authentication Key Generation 
(MNAKG) and Verifying Nonce
FNPNS, Random 
Number,  
Kauth{Nonce, MNPN} 
KSK{NAC} 
Generating PN1, PN2 using 
Prime Number Generator 
 Message 
de ID 
ata 
wledgement 
ent are the basic 
solution. First the 
the FNs and the 
is successfully 
an be performed 
scheme supports 
unctionalities in a 
r to another one. 
posed scheme for 
gorithm 
ong the FNs and 
assigned to every 
ed using a Secret 
is pre-assigned to 
he two randomly 
 SKG as a seed to 
 way secret key 
ent procedure is 
Each FN is provided with 
public key of the BS, its own 
way authentication key genera
Generator (SKG) and a one
function f( ), a Compromised 
and a network private key (Kprt
worth noting that FNs mus
revocation algorithm [25] in o
Generator (SKG) and the netwo
As far as the MNs are 
material is considered: a secret 
Kplc, an authentication key 
Number Sum (FNPNS), its ow
number. 
C. Cluster Formation 
Once the network is de
formation phase. During the c
FNs periodically broadcast a 
MNs for a given number of t
scheme). Such messages incl
nonce encrypted using the netw
that the FNs are deployed suc
messages from more than one
CH depends on the Hello mes
also keeps a list of neighbo
received Hello messages to po
for some reason, the MNs d
message within a given time 
Hello message including a no
public key to discover authen
describes the virtual network or
Figure 2. Net
1. FN → *  : Hello, H(Kprt{H
2. MN → *  : Hello (if FN H
3. FN → MN : Hello-Resp., H
D. Mobile Nodes Authenticati
To get access to the n
authenticate itself with a select
a “Join request” encrypted usi
request includes the Fixed N
Other MNs 
of 
g 
the following key material: the 
public/private key pair, a one-
tion function g(), a Secret Key 
 way secret key generation 
Node Detection Key (CNDK) 
) along with its own prime. It is 
t also implement a fast key 
rder to protect the Secret Key 
rk private key. 
concerned, the following key 
key (SK), a network public key 
Kauth, the Fixed Node Prime 
n prime number and a random 
ployed, FNs start the cluster 
luster formation phase, all the 
Hello messages to neighboring 
imes (3-times in the proposed 
ude nodes IDs and a random 
ork private key. It is assumed 
h that most MNs receive Hello 
 FN. The selection of FN as a 
sage signal strength. Each MN 
ring FNs from which it has 
ssibly identify backup CHs. If, 
o not receive any FN Hello 
period, they start broadcasting 
nce encrypted by the network 
tic neighboring FNs.  Fig. 2 
ganization. 
work topology  
ello}) 
ello is not received) 
(Kprt{Hello-Resp.}) 
on 
etwork, each MN needs to 
ed CH. To do so, the MN sends 
ng the network public key. The 
ode Prime Number Sum, a 
random number related to its authentication key and the nonce 
provided within the Hello Message sent by the selected CH 
along with its own prime number encrypted by MN’s 
authentication key. Once received such information, the CH is 
able to infer the authentication key of the MN by using one-
way authentication key generation function g() as follows 
            Kauth = g(FNPNS, random number, SKG)          (1) 
 Successful decryption of the encrypted nonce and MN 
prime number by the CH using the inferred Kauth proves the 
MN authenticity. It is worth noting that the use of SKG in 
Kauth generation guarantees that an authentic FN is actually 
generating the Kauth and that MN prime number is not revealed 
to any adversary node. After the authenticity check, the FN 
sends the joining confirmation and a Network Authentication 
Code (NAC) to the MN. This is used to reduce the 
authentication burden while the MN moves through different 
clusters within the same network. The Network Authentication 
Code is also periodically updated as a countermeasure to 
replay attacks or node replication attacks performed by an 
adversary. 
1. MN → CH : FNPNS, Random Number, Kaut{Nonce, MNPN} 
2. FN  : Generate Kauth using MNAKG and Verify Nonce 
3. CH → MN : NAC 
E. Key Establishment and Management 
To secure communication between the CH and the MN, 
each MN is assigned a secret key SK while its generation 
function is assigned to the FNs before the deployment. During 
the authentication phase, each CH receives the MN prime 
numbers of its member MNs. CHs using these MN prime 
numbers and the secret key generator SKG generate the first 
prime number using prime number generator (PN1); this prime 
number is further combined with the MN prime numbers and 
secret key generator SKG to generate the second prime 
number (PN2). Then, the CH generates the required secret key 
using a one way secret key generation function f( ), thus 
obtaining the same secret key owned by the specific MN  
            Secret key = f(PN1, PN2, MNPN, SKG)              (2) 
For secure communication between the MNs, a secret key 
between them is generated by the CH. For instance, if a 
mobile node A wants to establish a direct communication link 
with mobile node B, it sends its IDA along with the IDB to its 
CH. Then the CH generates a secret key for them using their 
IDs, prime numbers and one way secret key generation 
function f( ) and sends it to both MNs using the secret key 
shared with each of them. CHs also periodically inform the BS 
about their member MNs to avoid the node replication attacks 
in the network. 
1. MN → CH: FNPNS, Random Number, Kaut{Nonce, MNPN} 
2. CH   : Generate PN1, PN2 and SK 
3. CH → MN: SK{Join ACK, NAC}  
F. Mobile Nodes Leaving and Joining Clusters 
During the movement of a MN to perform its task, it may 
move from one cluster to another cluster in the network. To 
provide full connectivity to MNs, FNs are deployed such that 
each MN should normally receive Hello messages from more 
than one FN. One of the FNs is selected as a CH by the MN 
based on the Hello message received signal strength, while 
information about other neighboring FNs is kept as a backup. 
A MN moves from one cluster to another cluster if it finds its 
CH signal strength dropped below a certain threshold during 
its periodic check. Before the transition to the new cluster, a 
MN sends broadcast Hello messages to discover new 
neighbors and update the relevant list. Once the CH is selected 
base on the signal strength of the Hello message response, the 
MN sends to the old CH a leaving message also including the 
new CH ID and sends a join request containing the Network 
Authentication Code to the new CH. After the verification of 
the Network Authentication Code, the new CH contacts the old 
CH of the MN asking for its prime number. If the old CH 
received the leaving message from its MN including the new 
CH ID, it confirms the MN movement to the new CH by 
sending the MN prime number and also informs the BS to 
avoid node replication attacks. After receiving the MN prime 
number, the new CH accepts the joining request from the 
incoming MN. If, due to e.g., poor radio coverage or packet 
losses, the MN leaving message is not received by its previous 
CH and its joining request is received by the new CH, then 
upon the reception of the MN prime number request from the 
new CH about its MN, the previous CH tries to contact its MN 
to confirm the transition. If it receives a positive response 
from its MN or no response, it sends the MN prime number to 
the new CH and also informs the BS that the specific MN is 
moving to another CH. After receiving the MN prime number, 
the new CH generates the secret key SK of this MN and 
informs the BS about new MN ID.  The old CH deletes this 
MN from its MN members list and the BS updates the MN 
members lists related to the other CHs in order to avoid node 
replication attacks. 
1. MN → *   : Hello 
2. FN → MN  : Hello-Resp., H(Kprt{Hello-Resp.}) 
3. MN   : Verify Hello using Kplc and select new CH 
4. MN → new CH  : Kplc{NAC} 
5. MN → old CH : New CH ID 
6. new CH → old CH, BS : MNPN request using the FN public key 
7. old CH → new CH : MNPN using the FN public key 
G. Addition of New Mobile Nodes 
MNs are unreliable devices with limited power supply; 
hence they may fail or run out of power over time. This can 
cause coverage and connectivity problems in WSNs, 
significantly degrade network performance and shorten 
network lifetime. To overcome these problems, some MNs 
could be replaced and new MNs would be added in the 
network. However, adding new MNs poses new challenges for 
security schemes such as the establishment of security keys 
with the existing FNs and MNs; in fact, newly deployed MNs 
could be compromised or could be malicious nodes. 
In the proposed scheme, a newly deployed MN is pre-
loaded with a special authentication code along with the 
authentication key. The BS is in charge of informing the FNs 
about the addition of the new MN, also providing the relevant 
ID and a special authentication code. The purpose of this 
special authentication code is to avoid the Sybil attacks in 
which an adversary can create multiple copies of the 
compromised MN with new IDs and introduce them as new 
nodes in the network.  
The newly added MN broadcasts a Hello message 
encrypted using the network public key to discover its 
neighboring authentic FNs. This Hello message includes the 
MN ID and special authentication code. Upon the reception of 
Hello message from the new MN, neighboring FNs will check 
the special authentication code by comparing it with the BS-
provided code. After successful verification, FNs send their 
cluster identities and authentication nonce encrypted using the 
network private key. After receiving the response from the 
neighboring FNs, the MN will select one of the authentic FNs 
having the best signal to noise ratio as its CH and will send a 
joining request to establish a secret key and get the Network 
Authentication Code from its CH.  
IV. ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION 
In this section, the proposed scheme is analyzed using the 
OMNET++ simulator, in terms of network connectivity, 
network resilience against node capture attacks, energy 
consumption, memory cost and communication overhead. The 
simulation results have been obtained using OMNET++ 4.1 
with the mobility framework MiXiM 2.0.1. The simulation 
scenario is defined by a network composed of 500 MNs and 
16 FNs. The size of the network simulation area is 400m x 
400m. Both the FNs and the MNs use the 802.15.4 CSMA and 
radio specification based on the CC2420 radio chip. The 
transmission power is set to 10mW and sensitivity is set to -
95dBm for all nodes. The mobility of the MNs is described by 
the random walk mobility model in which the speed of the 
MNs is constant but a random direction is chosen periodically 
within a predefined range. More specifically, the speed of the 
MNs is set to 1m/s and their direction update interval to 0.1s. 
The simulations were repeated 3 times for 5000 seconds for 
each result. 
 Result comparison of the proposed solution with other 
existing key management protocols shows better network 
connectivity and resilience, with a significant reduction in 
memory and communication overhead. 
A. Network Connectivity 
In order to show the effectiveness of the proposed 
solution in terms of network connectivity, the simulation 
results of the proposed scheme are compared with [12], [17], 
[26] and [29] where the connectivity depends on the key 
sharing probability. For a balanced key pre-distribution 
scheme, the single key sharing probability between the MN 
and the FN is given by 
                  ܲݎሾܥ݋݊݊ሿ ൌ 1 െ ሺܲ െ ܭሻ! ሺܲ െ ܭሻ!ܲ! ሺܲ െ 2ܭሻ!                       ሺ3ሻ 
where K is the number of keys assigned to FNs and MNs from 
a pool of P keys. Instead, for the unbalanced key pre-
distribution [17, 26] scheme, the single key sharing probability 
is given by  
                 ܲݎሾܥ݋݊݊ሿ ൌ 1 െ ሺܲ െ ܭሻ! ሺܲ െ ܵሻ!ܲ! ሺܲ െ ܵ െ ܭሻ!                         ሺ4ሻ 
where K is the size of the key pool assigned to each MN and S 
(S>>K) is the size of the key pool assigned to each FN. 
In the proposed scheme, the Kplc is assigned to each MN 
and the Kprt to each FN before network deployment. These two 
keys connect a MN to an authentic FN of the network. Hence 
the connectivity of the network is almost 100% if and only if 
the FN is not compromised. Fig. 3 shows the comparison of 
OMNET++ simulation results for the network connectivity of 
the proposed scheme with [12], [17], [26] and [29]. 
Figure 3. Probability of sharing at least one common key (Connectivity) 
B. Memory Cost 
This section presents the comparison of memory overhead 
of the proposed scheme with some well known existing key 
management schemes for HSNs.  
In an ECC-based key management scheme [8], the total 
memory overhead is ሺ݊ெே ൅ 3ሻ כ ݊ிே ൅ 2݊ெே, where ݊ெே 
and ݊ிே are the numbers of MNs and FNs respectively [32]. 
Instead, in the solution presented by Yang et al. [20], each FN 
is preloaded with a pair of public/private keys and ݊ிே െ 1 
distinct pairwise keys, while no key is pre-loaded in the MNs. 
The memory overhead of this scheme is ሺ2 ൅ ݊ிே െ 1ሻ כ ݊ிே. 
According to the basic scheme [12], each node is loaded with 
q keys before deployment, thus resulting in a total memory 
overhead of ݍ כ ሺ݊ிே ൅ ݊ெேሻ. 
In the scheme proposed in this paper, each MN is loaded 
with only 3 keys (i.e., SK, Kplc and Authentication Key) and 
each FN is loaded with 6 keys (i.e., the BS public key, its own 
public/private key pair, SKG, CNDK and Kprt). The resulting 
memory overhead is 6݊ிே+3݊ெே. 
To analyze and compare the proposed scheme with the 
existing schemes [8, 12, 17, 20, 26], it is assumed that each 
FN is able to make a maximum of d connections with its 
neighboring MNs. According to [12], [17] and [26], if a node 
has Nc neighbors and that node has to establish secure links 
with only d neighbors, then the required key sharing 
probability should be  
                             Pr = d / Nc                                         (5) 
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For example, the single key sharing probability required 
to make 30 connections with the neighboring MNs out of 38 
neighbors is approximately 0.80. From fig. 3, each node in 
[12] should carry 400 keys and each FN in [17] should carry 
700 keys while each MN should carry 228 keys while in [26] 
each FN should carry 250 keys and each MN should carry 30 
keys. In our scheme, each FN should be loaded with only 6 
secret keys. 
Fig. 4 summarizes the performance offered by different 
solutions in terms of the total number of the keys deployed for 
different sizes of the WSN. The results show that the proposed 
scheme requires fewer keys compared to other approaches. 
For less dense networks, the proposed scheme and Yang’s 
scheme require almost the same number of keys. However, the 
proposed scheme performs better in dense networks. 
Figure 4. Comparison of memory overhead produce by the proposed 
scheme with some existing scheme 
C. Network Resilience to Node Compromised Attacks 
This section shows the effect of node compromised 
attacks on data communication capabilities. In the proposed 
scheme, FNs and MNs are provided with different security 
measures dealing with such attacks. Since FNs act as both 
CHs and data sinks for MNs, they are provided with tamper 
resistant hardware to protect their security material. Once the 
FN is captured, all security keys are replaced by a reference 
“compromised key” which does not allow the node to 
authenticate itself to the BS nor to accept any joining MN. On 
the contrary, MNs are not provided with the tamper resistant 
hardware. 
Node compromised attack in case of balanced and 
unbalanced key pre-distribution schemes for homogeneous 
and heterogeneous sensor networks have a significant impact 
on the security offered by the communication links operating 
within the network due to the large number of shared keys 
with other nodes in the network. The fraction of 
communications compromised by compromising n MNs in 
shared key pre-distribution schemes is given by 
                     ܲݎሾܥ݋݉݌ݎ݋݉݅ݏ݁݀ሿ ൌ 1 െ ሺ1 െ ܭܲሻ
௡                   ሺ6ሻ 
where K is the number of keys assigned to each MN from a 
pool of P keys. In case of compromised FNs, K is replaced by 
S in (6). Fig. 5 shows the OMNET++ simulation results about 
how many communications links a compromised MN can 
create with uncompromised MNs without involving the 
CH/FN. More specifically, the figure compares the proposed 
scheme with the schemes proposed in [12], [17], [26] and [29] 
with Pr[Conn]=0.8. The proposed scheme performs better 
because (i) a MN cannot establish directly a communication 
link with the other MNs of the network and (ii) all the FNs use 
the algorithm proposed in [28] to detect the compromised 
MNs.  
Figure 5. Fraction of communication compromised by capturing ‘n’ 
Mobile Nodes (MNs) 
Since the FNs act as trusted servers to the MNs, their 
compromission can severely affect the network security. Fig. 6 
shows a comparison of the OMNET++ simulation results for 
the FNs compromission of the proposed scheme with [12], 
[17] and [29]. It is clear from fig. 6 that FN compromission 
results in almost the same number of compromised links when 
using [12] and [17]. Although [29] proposed a balanced key 
distribution for the HSNs like [12] for homogeneous sensor 
networks, it performs better than [12] and [17] because it 
divides the key pool P into a number of groups equal to the 
number of clusters thus increasing not only network 
connectivity but also network resilience against both FN and 
MN capture attacks. 
Figure 6. Fraction of communication compromised by capturing ‘n’ 
Fixed Nodes (FNs) 
D. Communication Overhead 
In this section, the communication overhead is evaluated 
also analyzing the different contributions from authentication 
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and key establishment phases. The simulation scenario is 
modified in order to include 16 FNs and 500 MNs. 
a. Authentication Overhead 
Concerning the authentication overhead, the total 
number of packets exchanged during the authentication 
phase is considered. The authentication phase of the 
proposed solution is compared with some of the existing 
approaches ([30], [31] and [32]). OMNET++ simulation 
results show that the proposed scheme produces less 
authentication overhead than the existing schemes, as 
shown in fig. 7. 
Figure 7. Authentication overhead comparison 
b. Key Establishment Overhead 
The proposed solution is also compared with the 
basic homogeneous [12] and heterogeneous [17, 32] 
schemes. The results show a significant reduction of the 
communication overhead. A 99% network connectivity 
probability for [12] and [17] was taken into account, 
computing the number of keys required in each FN and 
MN (using the results of (3) and (4)). The obtained results 
are shown in fig. 8. There is only a slight difference in 
terms of communication overhead between the 
homogeneous and heterogeneous approach, but there is a 
big difference in terms of memory cost (fig. 4). 
Figure 8. Average number of key messages exchanged during the first key 
establishment phase 
 
 
c. Total Initialization phase Overhead 
This section presents the OMNET++ simulation 
results for the total communication overhead generated 
during the first authentication and key establishment 
phase. The results of the proposed scheme have been 
compared with the ones related to [30] and [32], since 
both solutions are based on the mutual authentication and 
key establishment phases. Figure 9 represents the 
resulting communication overhead by varying the size of 
the network. 
Figure 9. Total communication overhead in the network during the 
initialization phase 
E. Energy Consumption 
This section describes the average energy consumption of 
each node during the authentication and initialization phases 
of the network (again using the OMNET++ simulator). The 
proposed solution requires only 2 messages for the 
authentications as shown in fig. 7 compared to [31] which 
requires 4 messages and with [30, 32] which require 3 
messages for authentication. The average energy consumption 
of each node during the authentication phase in the proposed 
scheme compared with [30], [31] and [32] is shown in fig 10. 
Figure 10. Average energy consumption of each node during the 
authentication phase 
Fig. 9 also shows the effectiveness of combining the 
authentication and key establishment phases to reduce the total 
overhead during the initialization phase. Such optimization 
results in power savings at each node and in an overall 
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increase of the network life time.  Fig. 11 represents the 
OMNET++ results for the average energy consumption of 
each node during the initialization phase (authentication and 
key establishment) in the proposed scheme, as compared with 
[30] and [32]. The results show that the proposed solution of 
combining the authentication and key establishment messages 
reduces the energy consumption with respect to [30, 32] where 
separate messages are exchanged for key establishment 
between the nodes after their successful authentication.  
Figure 11. Average energy consumption of each node during the 
initialization phase 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, a key management scheme is proposed for 
cluster-based heterogeneous sensor networks. In comparison 
with existing approaches, the proposed solution provides 
better network connectivity, reduces memory overhead, 
increases network resilience against node capture attacks and 
requires minimum communication overhead during the 
authentication and key establishment phases. Hence it saves 
battery energy and increases the network life time. In this 
paper, only intra network movements of the mobile nodes 
were considered. Future work will analyze inter networks 
mobility scenarios. 
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